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The interactionof consumerdevicesand the internet, especially in relation to security,hasalways
beentenuous.Whereitisinthebestinterestsofcompaniestoproduceproductsthatarecheapand
accessible,thesetraitsoftengoagainstthatofsecurity.Thisinvestigationundertakesananalysisof
onesuchdevice– theDCS930L internetprotocol camera fromDLink.This camera isanalysed for
vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on those relating to authentication mechanisms. Several








updateandadjust its settings.Unfortunately, therehavebeenrecentsuggestions that IPcameras
contain less than ideal security (Heffner, 2013a; Sood& Gajbhiye, 2011). Given their purpose as
security devices, this can be understandably upsetting for consumers as their privacy maybe
impacted.
This research studied  one such device: the DCS930L from DLink (DLink Australia, 2013). This
camera was selected due to its features, availability and low cost. It is considered to be
representative of the consumergrade IP camera market in general. This brand of camera also
possess a history of dangerous vulnerabilities, including authentication bypasses and command
injection(Paleari,2013;Rocha,M.,etal.,2013).
In terms of features, the camera contains the ability to wirelessly access a network, as well as
operateasitsownaccesspoint.Additionally,itcancollaboratewithonlinesoftwarecontrolledbyD
Link, to give access to the device from remote locations. The device can also be programmed to




on the authentication mechanisms in particular. From here, possible attacks against these
authentication processes will be analysed.  Following this, postauthenticated attacks will be
investigated.Thatis,attacksthatrequireanauthenticatedusertoperform.
METHODOLOGY
Ameans tomonitor andmanipulate communication between the IP camera and the interacting
computerwasrequired.Wiresharkwasusedtomonitorthenetworkstream,duringbothEthernet
and wireless communications (Wireshark Foundation, 2013). Burpsuite was employed to capture
trafficmovingtowardthecamera,andmanipulateitasnecessary(PortSwigger,2013).
The contents of the current firmware embedded in the camera was considered vital pieces of






available to interested parties if the programs are used in commercial systems. A copy of this
informationwasobtained,butfoundtobeoutdated.
Webbasedforms,andothermethodsthroughwhichtocommunicatewiththedevice,werechecked
for sanitisation. Put another way, the web server was tested to see if it properly escapes and
sanitisestheinformationitreceives.Ifthisisnotthecase,thecameramaybeopentomanipulation.
HTML and hex encoding schemes were used, as well as special characters (such as null and
terminatingbytes).
AuthenticationandPreAuthenticationAttacks
The DCS930L camera in question appears to utilise two different authentication schemes: basic
access and digest access (NWG, 1999). Basic access authentication consists of encoding the







achieved by the server, it is assumed that the same username and password was used in each
calculation(andthusthattheclientisauthorised).
Each of these authentication schemes carries with it some weaknesses. Firstly, the basic





some issues. Firstly, the current implementation in the cameraappears toallow replayattacks.A
userwhohasmanagedtocapturealegitimateauthorisationrequest,cansimplyresendthatrequest
themselves,to'authenticate',andgainaccesstoaresource.
That said, this result is somewhat limited given the design of digest authentication. One of the
parametersofthisaccessschemeisthattheURLbeingrequestedbyapartyisitselfhashedwithin
the request. Thismeans thatany replayattackswill onlybeeffectiveagainst a single resourceor
request. In relation to thecamera, thereare instanceswhere the resourcebeing requested is the
videofeed,andthusareplayattackagainstthisresourcewillbeparticularlyeffective.Itistheorised
thatanattackercancontinuallyreplaytheauthenticatedrequestforconstantaccesstothisfeed.
Alternatively (or additionally), an eavesdropping attacker may wish to conduct an offline attack
againstalegitimatedigestauthorisationrequest.Asitstands,fourofthefivepiecesofinformation







basicor digest access) and senda request to the cameras server. Theredoesnot appear to be a
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mechanism to prevent this kind of attack built into the camera, such as a lockout period after a
certainnumberoffailedattempts.Additionally,theredoesnotappeartobeanyloggingorreporting
forthiskindofbehaviour.
This threat of a brute force attack is significantly increased when considering an additional bug
within theolder firmware versions. Specifically, until themost recent patch (Firmware v1.08b04),
passwords for theDSC930Lwere limited toonlyeightcharacters (DLink,2013).This significantly
decreases the number of combinations for a password, and thus increases the efficacy of brute
forcingthedevice.
AnotherattackagainsttheDCS930LauthenticationmaybepossiblethroughUDPbroadcasts.The







the camera name appears to be one of the pieces of information sent during this exchange. An
attacker may choose to manipulate this variable, and monitor the differences it makes on the
encrypted traffic. In addition, it appears that this encrypted communication occurs without the
passingof any variables (such as session keys). In turn, thiswould suggest that the algorithm for
encryptionishardcodedintoaprogram,storedbothonthedeviceandthewizardapplication.Ifan
attackerwere to reverse engineer this software, theymay have alternatemeans for determining
how the encryption schemeworks. From here, theymay be able tomanipulate the requests for
informationtothedevice,andthuscompromiseitssecurity.
Reverseengineeringofthefirmwarealsorevealsapieceofinformationintriguingtoanattacker:a
publicandprivatekeypair.Although theserverappears tosupportSSL traffic, thiswasonlyseen
during communication with the official DLink website (when attempting to access the device
remotely through their interface). Applying the private key with Wireshark, some of the
communicationbetweenthecameraandthewebsitewasrevealed.Thiscommunicationappeared
to access resources that were already publically accessible (see the next paragraph for more
informationonthis).Nofurtherinformationwasrevealedwithinthiscommunicationstream,butit
doessuggestthatthecameracanbedirectlycommunicatedwithbyDLink.
In addition to the weaknesses of the authentication mechanisms, there appear to be several















The wireless schemes employed by the device are also somewhat vulnerable. The camera itself
containswireless capability in two forms: infrastructure and ad hoc. Infrastructuremode uses an
availableroutertoconnecttoanetwork,allowingausertoaccessthecamerathroughtherouter.
Alternatively, the device can also be placed in ad hocmode, inwhich it creates its ownwireless
network.Ausercanthenconnectdirectlytothedevice.Unfortunately,thisadhocmodeappearsto





access to sensitive information is one such example. Thewebbased interface that a user would
typicallyinteractwithappearstosourceinformationfrom'hidden'cgifiles.Thesefilesappeartobe
directly accessible by url, assuming the url is known by the interested party, and that party is
authenticated.Reverseengineering thefirmware,aswellas investigatingthestringsstoredwithin
the main web server executable, reveal the location of these resources. They typically store
information such as FTP details, the username and password of any attached email accounts,






The server appears to employ clientside argument validation via JavaScript on several forms. By
interactingwitharequestoutsideofthebrowser(eg.Throughburpsuite)itispossibletobypassthis
validation.Whilsttheserverdoesseemtoperformsomeadditionalvalidationitself,certainrequests
canstillproduceunwantedbehaviour inthe IPcamera.Forexample,sendingarequest tochange
thenameofthecameratonovalue(ie.Nullorempty)resultsinthedevicebecominginaccessible.




in the user list, given that it is simply a blank line. Additionally, it is not possible to delete this
username from the list of users. Thismay not seem too unfortunate, although it does open the
camerauptoapersistentthreat.Ifanattackerweretosetthepasswordoftheblankusertonull(or
empty), certain parts of the camera will then be accessible without authentication (or more
correctly,byauthenticatingwithausernameofnullandpasswordofnull).Admittedly,ifanattacker
has the ability to add users to a system, they are already in a powerful position. The inability to
removetheuser,however,aswellasthecamouflageitemploys,increasesthisthreatsomewhat.






Overall, the IP camera in question containsmoderate levels of security. Although it does exhibit
someweaknesses, the lackof evidence for authorisationbypassor remote access is promising. It
appears that the vulnerabilities discovered earlier in its lifecycle have been repaired, and have
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ultimately acted to increase the strength of the device as a whole. Additionally, the proper
sanitisationofvariablesbytheembeddedwebserverisconsideredeffective.
That said, those weaknesses identified can still be used to impact a user. To this end, several
recommendationsaremadetomitigateorpreventthesevulnerabilities.Firstly,thefirmwareonthe












access to the network. For example, the credentials for the FTP server are stored in the clear.
Threats such as these should be considered when assessing the application of an IP camera. In
practice,itwouldbewisetoisolatethisinformationtothecameraalone,assumingthatatonestage
itwillbeaccessedbymaliciousactors.
Oneareaof themethodology thatwasperhapsat faultwas themeasurementofnetwork traffic,









have to be strongly considered. It also offers further evidence and reasoning forwhy uptodate
patchingofsoftwareandfirmwareissovitallyimportantinallsecurityapplications.
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